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*
 
 
 In his important new article, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than ‘Off Switches’: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, John Golden proves my thesis:  prophylactic injunctions are, 
and should be, common, normal types of equitable relief.
1
  His careful and detailed analysis of 
the type and frequency of injunctions issued in patent infringement cases exposes the myth that 
prophylaxis is illegitimate.  Steeped in details of patent law, Golden’s work nevertheless 
contributes significantly to the broader transsubstantive questions of the metes and bounds of 
equitable relief.  His work documents with factual detail and normative argument what I have 
previously argued: that “prophylactic relief develops almost instinctively from lawyers and 
jurists seeking remedial alternatives to empty commands simply to stop the behavior.”2  Golden 
builds a persuasive argument for abandoning the simple “off switch” injunctions ordering the 
cessation of infringement for more specifically tailored injunctions of prophylactic relief.  
  In his article, Professor Golden provides valuable insight into what is really happening in 
the field of patent injunctions.  His empirical study collects all injunctions issued by U.S. district 
courts in patent infringement cases in 2010.
3
  He finds that the majority of patent injunctions are 
preventive injunctions ordering the defendant to stop the infringement.  He organizes these into 
three sub-types based on scope: prohibitions on the exact process, the exact process plus 
variations, and any process that violates the patent.  Golden finds a prevalence of “obey-the-law” 
injunctions prohibited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and an absence of reparative 
injunctions, finding only one.  One-third of the injunctions he classifies as “specially tailored” 
prophylactic injunctions, differentiated into four subcategories.  He offers mathematical formulas 
and an alternative taxonomy that may be unnecessarily complex and risk obscuring the flexibility 
of equity.
4
  Ultimately, though, these classifications advance the thinking about the optimal 
equitable relief for patent infringement. 
 Golden’s research provides good evidence to counter the conventional wisdom that 
prophylactic injunctions are suspect.  Prophylactic injunctions are defined as injunctions that 
address the facilitators or causes of continued harm by ordering additional precautions targeting 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law.  
1 Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LIT. 99 (2007); Tracy A. Thomas,  The 
Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 301 (2004). 
2 Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra note 1, at 104. 
3 John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than ‘Off Switches’: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, ___ 
TEX. L. REV. *19 (2012). 
4 Similarly, Judge Richard Posner has used mathematical formulas to explain the proper operation of equity.  See 
American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (developing mathematical 
formula for assessing whether preliminary injunction should issue).   
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that collateral behavior.
5
  At times, this relief has been depicted as illegitimate and overly broad 
relief that reaches beyond the scope of the harm.
6
  It carries a negative image of judicial activism 
extending beyond the contours of the legal right.
7
  Nevertheless, there has been a begrudging 
acceptance that sometimes prophylactic relief is a necessary and effective remedy.
8
     
 I have argued elsewhere that prophylactic injunctions have gotten a bad rap.
9
  Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, prophylaxis is not inappropriate judicial activism, but rather is the 
regular equitable discretion used by courts to flexibly fashion practical relief.
10
  Such injunctions 
do not overreach, but instead precisely target the plaintiff’s rightful position by restricting 
ancillary, causative conduct that is necessary for protecting that position.
11
  Prophylactic 
injunctions are prevalent in a variety of subject areas.
12
  They are seen in public law cases of 
school desegregation, prison reform, and sexual harassment.
13
  They are also seen in private law 
cases of securities regulation, antitrust, and as Golden demonstrates, patent infringement.
14
  
Prophylactic injunctions offer an immensely practical remedy that makes the abstract legal right 
tangible with specific, clear commands that circumscribe defendants’ conduct assisting 
compliance and enforcement.  
                                                 
5 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 314-15.  They are similar to prophylaxis in constitutional law, 
criminal procedure, and Section 5 legislation designed to be extraprotective of rights.  See Tracy A. Thomas, 
Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 W&M BILL RGTS. J. 343 
(2002); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195 (1988). 
6 See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711-12 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
7 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 303; Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra note 1, 99-100; 
Thomas, Understanding, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
8 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (prophylactic injunction necessary when prior 
less restrictive preventive injunction in abortion protest case failed to prevent harm); Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network 
of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997) (describing prophylactic measures as necessary to prevent violent, assaultive 
harm involved in abortion protests); Hutto, 437 U.S. at 678 (restricting time in punitive isolation as facilitator of 
unconstitutional conditions where defendant prison had ample opportunity to remedy the conditions and comply 
with the court’s earlier less restrictive order).   
9 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 305; Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra note 1, at 100. 
10 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 305.  “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power 
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.  Flexibility rather 
than rigidity has distinguished it.  The regularities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for 
nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing 
private claims.”  Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
11 See Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 305. 
12 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 288 (4th ed. 2010) (“Examples [of prophylactic relief] turn 
up everywhere, some controversial, some not.”). 
13See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-31 (1971); Women Prisoners of the 
D.C. Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), modified, 899 F.Supp. 
659 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ordering prophylactic measures of monitoring, 
training, complaint systems, and expert consultation to prevent future constitutional harms to female inmates); 
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ordering institution to adopt procedures for investigating 
and adjudicating sexual harassment complaints); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1990) 
(affirming injunction ordering sexual harassment education and training). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp, 231 F.Supp. 2d 144, 164 (2002) (imposing prophylactic measures to 
prevent antitrust monopoly); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 
(1963) (ordering advisor to disclose to clients his own personal securities dealings in order to prevent continued 
fraud); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (prohibiting all zone-delivered pricing as 
prophylactic measure to prevent illegal price fixing); see George W. Dent Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities 
Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983) (identifying prophylactic orders in securities cases 
to include prohibiting violator from acting as officer of any public company, adding reporting requirements, and 
appointing an independent majority to a corporate board).  
 4 
Golden’s work is significant because it offers a window into both the reality and the ideal.  He 
shows that prophylactic injunctions are routine remedies ordered by district courts.  And he takes 
the normative step of arguing that prophylactic or specially tailored injunctions should be the 
optimal injunctive remedy because of their tremendous potential for tailoring relief to the 
equities and efficiencies of a given case.  This research makes a persuasive case for shifting our 
assumptions about prophylactic relief from that of distaste to one of preference.   
 
I.  Golden’s Taxonomy 
 
 Professor Golden adopts his own taxonomy of patent injunctions to describe the data of 
the district court cases.  He draws on the conventional classifications of the types of injunctions: 
preventive, reparative, prophylactic, and structural.
15
  Golden however is primarily concerned 
about scope.  Scope and typology are two different analytical questions, though they are often 
intertwined.  Scope is a question of the amount or measure or breadth of the injunctive relief.  
Typology or character of the injunction goes to its key functionality, whether it will work against 
the harm, the consequences of harm, the facilitators of continued harm, or the harmful structure 
of the defendant.  Judicial crafting of appropriate injunctive relief involves questions both of 
what and how much relief to order. 
  Golden classifies the data into eight categories demarcated by both type and scope.  He 
identifies three general categories of injunctions that he sees in the district court patent cases: 
preventive, reparative, and specifically tailored.
16
  The first category is that of the usual “off 
switch” that orders the infringing conduct to stop.  He identifies three subtypes of preventive 
injunctions based on increasing breadth of scope:  Type 0 (prohibits exact product found to 
infringe); Type 1 (prohibits exact product plus variations “not of colorable difference”); and 
Type 2 (prohibits any infringement of patent).
17
  The second category is reparative injunctions, 
but contains only one example in the data.  The remaining injunctions he classifies as specially 
tailored prophylactic injunctions of both extraprotective and subprotective scope.  He 
differentiates these prophylactic injunctions into four subtypes.
18
  Type C injunctions prohibit 
correlated activities beyond that activity which constitutes infringement.  Most of the 
prophylactic injunctions Golden found fall into this Type C category.  Type D injunctions order 
the destruction, disablement, or delivery of remaining infringing products.  Type B are 
“reformulated bounds” injunctions that prohibit a general range of conduct without reference to 
the patent.  And Type M injunctions are moderated injunctions which include a carve out or 
exception explicitly or implicitly permitting some future infringing behavior.   
Golden’s taxonomy is most valuable for illustrating the increasing levels of broad scope 
an injunction might take.  It illustrates gradations of protection that create significant differences 
in restrictions of the infringing company’s future innovation.  He uses the example of the 
                                                 
15 DAVID LEVINE, DAVID JUNG & TRACY THOMAS, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 52 (West 5th ed. 2009); 
Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 315-19.  Preventive relief orders the harm to stop, reparative 
repairs the harm by preventing the continued consequences, prophylactic addresses the facilitators of continued 
harm, and structural restructures the institutional defendant.  Id.  Structural injunctions are not found in Golden’s 
data, but would include an order divesting a monopoly to create two separate companies incapable of perpetuating 
the illegal monopoly behavior.  See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering 
divestiture of Microsoft into two “baby Bills”), vacated on appeal. 
16 Golden, supra note 3, at *5. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
 5 
infringement of Gillette’s 3-blade razor by the Schick Quattro multi-blade razor to illustrate the 
difference in equitable options.
19
  A court could prohibit Schick from making the Quattro (Type 
0), making the Quattro and any other product of “no colorable difference” to reach product 
variations (Type 1), or from making “any product that infringes Gillette’s patent” (Type 2).  
Specially tailored injunctions might prohibit Schick from making “all multi-blade razors” (Type 
B), or making “the Quattro razor and any variation with two to four blades” (Type M), or require 
Schick to “destroy all remaining Schick Quattro razors in inventory” (Type D), or “submit future 
variations of multi-blade razors for Gillette’s approval” (Type C). 
Reasonable minds might differ as to some of these categorizations.  Type D destruction 
orders might be classified as reparative rather than specially tailored.  These orders attack the 
consequences of the past harm by ordering the destruction of the exact remaining products.  Type 
M specially tailored injunctions might instead be classified as preventive.  These moderated 
injunctions limit the range of variations prohibited seems to fall between exact and colorable 
variations of Types 0 and 1, and thus might be labeled “Type .5” to show placement in the scope 
continuum.
20
  If the data is reorganized this way, the patent infringement landscape includes 
some reparative relief, four types of preventive relief, and prophylactic injunctions.
21
   
Professor Golden uses his taxonomy to make observations about the Federal Circuit’s treatment 
of two categories of patent injunctions: Type 2 and reparative.  He hones in on the prevalence of 
obey the law injunctions like “do not infringe the ‘777 patent” and the absence of reparative 
injunctions as rules outside the remedial norm.   
 
A.  The Prevalence of Obey the Law Injunctions 
 
Golden finds it “striking, if not shocking” that the majority of injunctions issued in patent 
infringement cases use forbidden obey-the-law language.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) 
requires that injunctions be drafted in specific language and “describe in reasonable detail” the 
acts to be restrained.  This necessitates an avoidance of obey the law injunctions that command 
compliance with the law generally, for example, ordering that the defendant is “enjoined from 
violating Title VII.”  The Supreme Court has indicated that the policy behind the rule is “to 
prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid 
                                                 
19 These hypotheticals are based on the case Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), which denied a preliminary injunction because patent covered only a three-bladed razor and Schick’s Quattro 
was a four-bladed razor. 
20 Using this Type M injunction, Professor Golden makes the case that prophylactic injunctions can be 
subprotective, rather than solely extraprotective.  These examples don’t necessarily make the case, since Type M 
injunctions are more preventive than prophylactic.  Prophylactic injunctions in general have been conceptualized as 
extraprotective, but the concept of issuing injunctions that protect less than the plaintiff’s rightful position due to 
burdens on the defendant is a standard concept of remedies law applicable to injunctions.  See LEVINE, supra note 
15, at 101; David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and 
Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1988). 
21 In addition, Type B injunctions may not be prophylactic, but rather preventive, offering the broadest scope of 
stopping the harm by general prohibitions and thus might be called “Type 3” injunctions following Golden’s 
nomenclature.  See Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note, 1 at 318.  Golden follows the lead of most 
commentators who label as prophylactic those orders prohibiting an entire general category of products or processes 
sweeping in legal activity.  See id. at 317n.69.  In the patent context, these are orders that prohibit general activity 
without reference to the patent, for example, prohibiting production of all pet beds with swing arms, rather than just 
swing-arm beds with three legs detailed in the patent.    
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the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.”22  
Otherwise, future conduct different and independent from the past wrong are swept with the 
reach of contempt sanctions.  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has explicitly stated that these 
types of injunctions are prohibited as overly broad.
23
   
But Golden demonstrates that the rule is not being followed and that such injunctions are 
in fact common.
24
  His study finds that 57% of the patent injunctions were this type of obey-the-
law injunction.  These injunctions commanded “do not infringe the ‘777 patent” or “do not 
infringe claim one of the ‘777 patent.”25  He searches for explanations between contested and 
uncontested injunctions, permanent and preliminary relief, technical subject matter, geography of 
the issuing court, and settled versus litigated cases, but finds no statistically significant 
explanation for the overall high error rate.
26
  He concludes that it may be “that the very 
prevalence of such error generates noncorrective inertia” in that the familiarity of the language 
results in it “being perceived as unsuspicious.”27  It could also be that the assumptions of Rule 
65(d) are wrong, at least in the patent context, and that lawyers and litigants clearly understand 
the dictates and parameters of “do not infringe the patent” which strikes the right balance 
between protection and innovation.
28
  
The perceived problem of obey the law injunctions is perhaps much ado about nothing.  
As Golden notes later in his analysis, the Circuit is not actually drafting true obey the law 
injunctions.  The patent orders do not say “do not violate the U.S. Patent Act,” but instead forbid 
future infringement of a specific patent, “do not infringe the ‘712 patent.”  Granted, this type of 
order is broader and leaves room for violation of the order by completely new practices not at 
issue in the initial suit.  But the question of breadth of scope is not an issue of drafting, which is 
the only command of the federal rule.   
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has developed an easy corrective rule.  At the contempt 
phase, these Type 2 “do not infringe the patent” injunctions are simply interpreted as narrower 
Type 1 injunctions prohibiting the infringement by the specific product at issue in the underlying 
case or its colorable differences.
29
  Type 2 language is thus considered harmless error.
30
  Of 
course, it would certainly be easier if courts and lawyers would simply follow the rule.
31
  As 
                                                 
22 Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). 
23See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263 , 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS 
Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys. Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 
F.2d 476, 479089 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
24 KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (observing “that injunctions 
are frequently drafted or approved by the courts in general terms, broadly enjoining ‘further infringement’ of the 
patent despite the language of Rule 65(d).  . . ”). 
25 Golden, supra note 3, at *39.  
26 Id. at *39-50. 
27 Id.  
28 Golden comments that Rule 65(d) might be “less than entirely intuitive,” noting that Type 2 injunctions are 
particularly instructive for design patents and that courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia have found 
Type 2 injunctions to be the standard, instructive form of relief.  Id. at *48-49.  See also McComb v. Jacksonville 
Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949) (enforcing injunction to obey the Fair Labor Standards Act and finding such 
generalization necessary to restrain defendants’ proclivity). 
29 Id. at*23 (citing KSM Fastening, 776 F.2d at 1526). 
30 Id. at *24 (citing Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
31 See Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (objecting to, but still enforcing, injunction that 
failed to comply with Rule 65(d) by improperly referencing other documents).  “Rule 65(d) is simple, clear, 
sensible, easily complied with, and not even new; we are distressed by the failure of the parties and the district judge 
to have complied with it in this case.”  Id.  
 7 
Golden notes, compliance with this rule is not particularly difficult: just use Type 0 or Type 1 
language prohibiting the exact behavior, with or without colorable differences.
32
 
 
B.  The Absence of Reparative Relief 
 
The absence of reparative injunctions altogether in the patent context is much more 
surprising and potentially problematic.  Reparative injunctions are among the classic, traditional, 
and usually non-controversial types of relief.
33
  Golden’s research identifies only one reparative 
injunction.
34
  Thus he concludes that compliance with Federal Circuit precedent is quite good 
here, in contrast to the Type 2 injunctions.  For the Federal Circuit has adopted a blanket 
prohibition on this category of common equitable relief.
35
  
When it comes to remedies, the Federal Circuit has been a bit of a maverick.  The Circuit 
has shown that it is willing to go its own way, bucking the usual traditional rules of remedies in 
crafting appropriate remedies for patent harms.  Its originality, however, has been reined in by 
the Supreme Court, which has twice in recent years overruled the Federal Circuit’s remedial 
approach.  In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., the Court unanimously chastised the Federal 
Circuit for refusing to apply the traditional balancing test for qualifying for injunctive relief and 
instead adopting a categorical rule that injunctions should always issue in patent infringement 
cases.
36
  “The gumption of the Federal Circuit in unilaterally altering the longstanding common-
law principles of equity fueled the Court’s criticism.”37  Similarly, in MedImmune Inc. v. 
Genetech, Inc., the Court struck down the Federal Circuit’s categorical remedial approach for 
declaratory judgments.
38
  The Circuit substituted the established test for determining a ripe case 
for declaratory relief with its own unique test for establishing a justiciable controversy.
39
   The 
Supreme Court in a near unanimous decision again struck down the appellate court’s exceptional 
rules for patents and “chided the Federal Circuit for its remedial audacity.”40 
The Federal Circuit seems to have created yet another exception to remedial rules, this 
time prohibiting reparative injunctions for patent infringement.  According to Golden, the 
Federal Circuit is concerned about reparative injunctions because they “remedy” or “correct” 
patent infringement rather than “prevent” future infringement.41  The Court understands its 
jurisdictional authority to be limited by section 283 of the U.S. Patent Act which authorizes it “to 
grant injunctions in accordance with principles of equity to prevent violation of any right.”42  
                                                 
32 Golden, supra note 3, at *39. 
33 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §2.9, at 225 (2d ed. 1993); LAYCOCK, supra note 12.  
34 The one injunction he has coded as reparative is an order to provide a written letter of apology.  Batesville Servs., 
Inc. v. S. Rain Casket and Funder Supply, No. 1:09-CV-257, at 5 (N.D. Ind. July 15, 2010). 
35 Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010); John Hopkins 
Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Eli Lily & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990); but see TiVo Inc. v. Echostar, 646 F.3d 869, 890 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (stating that “district 
courts are in the best position to fashion an injunction tailored to prevent or remedy infringement.”). 
36126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).  See Tracy A. Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON J. INT. PROP. 187 (2008). 
37 Thomas, eBay Rx, supra note 36, at 189. 
38 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007).   
39 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, In., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see David I. Levine & Charles E. Belle, 
Declaratory Relief After MedImmune, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 491 (2010). 
40 Thomas, eBay Rx, supra note 36, at 190. 
41 Golden, supra note 3, at *26 
4235 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (emphasis added); Spine Solutions, 620 F.3d at 1320.  
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And so it has held that “[a]n injunction is only proper to prevent future infringement of a patent, 
not to remedy past infringement.”43   
This thinking, however, demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of reparative 
relief.  All injunctive relief is aimed at preventing future harm.  Reparative relief is no different.  
Reparative injunctions attack the continued effects of past harm in order to prevent that ongoing 
harm in the future.
44
  This relief prevents the harmful consequences of violations that otherwise 
will continue in the future.
45
  The leftover results of past harm need to be altered, in a sense 
“repairing” the past infraction, while serving the general purpose of preventing harm in the 
future from those continued effects.  Excluding this type of injunctive relief from the possible 
remedies for patent infringement thus permits the consequences of patent infringement to 
continue, essentially allowing infringers to get away with it, at least once.  This type of 
categorical rule denying traditional equitable relief would likely capture the interest of a 
reviewing Supreme Court which has not looked favorably on the Federal Circuit’s creation of 
unique remedial rules for patents. 
However, it may also be that this alarm is unfounded, and that the courts are actually 
issuing reparative relief in patent infringement cases.  Many of the injunctions Golden has 
classified as specifically tailored are reparative relief.
46
  These are disposal orders where the 
defendant is ordered to destroy, disable, or deliver for destruction remaining inventory that 
infringes the patent.
47
  These orders target the leftover effects of past harm—the remaining 
product supply—and prevent the future harm of the ongoing sale or use of those products.  These 
injunctions address the consequences left over from the harm that needs to be prevented going 
forward.  They are not prophylactic because they do not address a cause or facilitator of harm 
that in and of itself is not illegal, and they are not preventive because they are not a command 
prohibiting new infringement in the future.
48
   
The two cases Golden discusses as proof of the Federal Circuit’s rejection of reparative 
relief are primarily about scope.  In these cases, the appellate court ultimately rejects the 
proposed reparative relief because of its overbroad reach.
49
  The lower courts had ordered 
destruction of products in foreign locales.  The overturning of these injunctions focused on the 
overbreadth of the extraterritorial reach where those foreign inventories showed no threat of 
distribution in the U.S. and thus no risk to infringement of the U.S. patent.  The scope of an 
injunction must have a nexus with the perceived threat, and thus the injunctions were rejected for 
this missing link between the conduct and the harm.  Reparative injunctions, like all injunctions, 
                                                 
43 Spine Solutions, 620 F.3d at 1320. 
44 LAYCOCK, supra note 12, at 269; see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) 
(ordering not just the cessation of racially-discriminatory student school assignments but the immediate admission 
of students to the public schools); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering new election for justice 
of the peace where election tainted by racial discrimination against voters). 
45 Id.  
46 See supra text accompanying note 20.  There were 7 destruction or disablement orders out of 143 injunctions.  
Golden, supra note 3, at *53. 
47 TiVo, 646 F.3d at 890 (ordering disablement of DVR functionality in remaining units); Caught Fish Enters., LLC 
v. Metal Roof Innovations, Ltd., No. 09-cv-02878 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2010) (requiring infringer to ship to plaintiff 
for destruction all remaining product in their possession or control); Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Am., Inc. v. 
Checkmate Geosynthetics, In.c, No. 6:09-cv-557-Orl-35KRS (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2010). 
48  
49 Spine Solutions, 620 F.3d at 1320; Johns Hopkins, 152 F.3d at 1366. 
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can sometimes be overbroad in scope.
50
  The courts’ issuance of destruction orders (for US 
inventory) in other cases shows that it has not eliminated this category wholesale, but instead, is 
demanding that injunction relief be of proper scope.
51
  Thus, despite the Federal Circuit’s dicta 
against reparative relief, courts are finding it appropriate as part of its usual resolution of disputes 
as commonly ordered in other types of cases.    
 
II.  The Optimal Injunction 
 
The purpose of Golden’s study ultimately is to determine the optimal injunction for 
patent infringement cases.
52
  His solution is a specially tailored injunction.  He argues that 
specially tailored prophylactic injunctions should be the norm and replace the conventional “do 
not infringe” Type 2 obey-the-law injunctions that currently dominate the decisions.  Golden’s 
argument ultimately is a plea for specificity.  Tailored injunctions, he argues, appropriately 
accommodate the protections guaranteed to patent holders while facilitating socially desirable 
innovation.  While Type 1 colorable differences injunctions might seem to be an appropriate 
default, they “fall far short of providing a complete answer to problems of injunction scope.”53  
Patentees are unsatisfied with the protection offered by these narrow injunctions, the vagaries of 
“colorable differences” invite continued litigation and business uncertainty over permissible 
variations, and the orders are “too easily circumvented.”54  Golden instead finds value in 
preferring specially tailored injunctions like prophylactic relief.
55
   
 
A.  Incentives and Efficiencies 
 
In evaluating the optimal injunctive relief for patent infringement, Golden is guided by 
concerns of over and under deterrence.  Underdeterrence of infringement is a concern of narrow 
injunctions that leave a rational infringer with substantial reason to pursue a course of action 
likely constituting further infringement because it will not be subjected to contempt.  If 
injunctions are inadequate to protect patentee rights, there is the potential for socially undesirable 
erosion of the value of those patent rights.
56
  A broad injunction on the other hand, threatens 
overdeterrence because the severity of threatened contempt sanctions deters future activity that is 
unlikely to be contempt, even though it would likely not be infringing.  This is a concern because 
society rationally wishes to encourage market actors, even adjudged infringers, to develop and 
disseminate innovations through product redesign.
57
  Golden finds the solution in a successfully 
drafted specially tailored injunction which “can possess comparatively clear limits that provide 
safe havens for a broad range of potential future activities,” and whose havens reduce the 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (reversing reinstatement of 
teacher as overly broad for guaranteeing de facto tenure to teacher on renewable contract). 
51 See cases cited supra note 47; Proveris Scientific Corp. v. InnovaSystems Inc., No. 05-12424-WGY (D. Mass 
May 11, 2007) (requiring defendant to “destroy all inventory of its OSA product”).  
52 Not everyone agrees on the practical appropriateness of injunctive relief.  See H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, 
Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661 
(2010).   
53 Golden, supra note 3, at *62. 
54 Id. at *62, *64, *69. 
55His preferred specially tailored injunctions include prophylactic injunctions Type C and Type B and more specific, 
narrow preventive injunctions Type M. 
56 Id. at *67. 
57 Id. at *58. 
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possibility that “a combination of uncertainty and infringer risk aversion will cause an 
injunction’s deterrent effect to overshoot its mark.”58 
Golden argues that specially tailored relief is more efficient.  He identifies the options 
defendants have to react to injunctions by either stopping production of the product, paying 
damages in lieu of the injunction, or designing around the injunction.
59
  He finds value in 
injunctions that create incentives to design around the injunction because they contribute to 
further innovation.   Golden argues than a positive justification for the patent system is the 
incentive to design around competitors’ products, thus bringing the steady flow of innovations to 
the marketplace.
60
  He offers a different approach than a typical one offered by law and 
economics scholars concerned with efficient injunctions focusing on the buyout of the 
injunction.
61
  To these theorists, the efficient injunction is one that provides leverage to 
incorporate legal norms into the dispute, but which permits the parties to negotiate around the 
injunction to reach an efficient result permitting desired profit-maximizing behavior.  However, 
Golden notes that such bargained solutions are not always feasible, whether because of 
information costs, distrust between the parties, strategic behavior, or holdout behavior, and thus 
reasonable licenses do not always occur.
62
  He instead finds the operative economic value to be 
one that encourages the socially desirable innovation behavior embodied in the patent law.  
Prophylactic injunctions also offer functional benefits.  A prophylactic remedy can 
“counter the defendant’s resistance to compliance, provide precise notice to the defendant of 
expected conduct, and facilitate the court’s oversight” and enforcement of the order.63  Golden 
demonstrates how specially tailored injunctions in the patent context provide better notice, 
compliance, enforceability, and administrability of the injunction.
64
  Providing detailed 
background about the law of contempt,
 65
 he shows how tailored injunctions generate increased 
compliance with issued injunctions by providing clearer instruction, and may even increase 
compliance by third parties who otherwise might be encouraged to disrespect those patent 
rights.
66
  These specially tailored injunctions also reduce the chilling effect on desired design-
around activity, providing another positive aspect to such relief.
67
  While prophylactic 
injunctions might entail more upfront costs in drafting a tailored injunction rather than parroting 
the language of the statute, those costs are saved at the back end by avoiding or minimizing costs 
of enforcement and contempt.
68
  This tailored approach provides an opportunity to tailor the 
                                                 
58 Id. at *65.   
59 Id. at *16. 
60 Id. at *10. 
61 LEVINE, supra note 15, 92-94. 
62 Golden, supra note 3, at 61. 
63 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note, at 372, 379; see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 
YALE L.J. 585, 587 (explaining that specific measures eliminate the defendant’s discretion to avoid the change 
necessary to conform with the legal right, thereby ensuring a higher level of remedial effectiveness.). 
64 Golden, supra note 3, at *73-74. 
65 Golden interestingly discovers virtually zero instances of valid criminal contempt sanctions in patent cases.  Id. at 
*12.  This conclusion is based on an electronic search of case databases since 1970, but which would not turn up 
unreported cases like most contempt orders.  The conclusion however makes sense because criminal contempt 
sanctions require process commiserate with criminal due process, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Sixth 
and Fifth Amendment rights, etc., and most civil courts get this wrong.  See United Mine Works v. Bagwell, 512 
U.S. 821 (1994).  
66 Golden, supra note 3, at *66. 
67 Id. at *67. 
68 Id. at *66. 
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concerns of both parties more carefully to better address the practical innovation and business 
realities of the parties.   
 
B. Prophylaxis as Threshold Rather than Afterthought 
 
Prophylactic relief has often been used as a remedy of last resort.
69
  The conventional 
suspicion of prophylaxis as judicial activism and its prevalence in public law cases countenanced 
a cautious approach to issuing this relief.
70
  Courts thus often reserved prophylactic relief for 
recalcitrant defendants or particularly obstreperous conduct when less restrictive injunctions 
were ineffective.
71
  The Federal Circuit has followed this approach, utilizing broad prophylactic 
injunctions in cases of flagrant and continued violations of prior orders.
72
  This use of 
prophylaxis as a last resort, Golden notes, has value beyond the expected gain from increased 
compliance in the individual case, offering a “systemic gain from a more general signal to third 
parties of courts’ willingness and capacity to ensure that patent rights are ultimately respected.”73 
Golden, however, would expand the use of prophylactic relief into a conventional, initial 
remedy.  His empirical research demonstrates that prophylactic injunctions are in fact being used 
as remedies of first resort in patent cases because they provide the specific tailoring effective at 
balancing protection of patentee rights while fostering innovation.
74
  I agree with Golden’s 
argument to move prophylactic relief to the front line.   
The conventional judicial restraint in using prophylaxis as a last resort arose out of cases 
with defendants like prisons, schools, and governmental institutions.  Courts adopted a “special 
deference to public institutional defendants” out of concern with federalism and “the interests of 
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs” which resulted in prophylactic relief 
being applied as a secondary rather than initial remedy.
75
  In other cases prophylaxis was a 
remedy because there were constitutional implications of limiting defendants’ activities, such as 
restricting protestors’ first amendment rights to political speech.76  These types of concerns are 
                                                 
69 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 353; Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra note 1, at 112. 
70 William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE 
L.J. 635, 695-97 (1982) (“[R]emedial discretion in institutional suits is inevitably political in nature,” and therefore 
“presumptively illegitimate” except when political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such discretion are 
“seriously and chronically in default” in which case judicial discretion is a “necessary” and “legitimate” substitute.). 
71 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978);  
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).  In another example, the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Plata upheld an injunction ordering the release of prison inmates to address the overcrowding causing 
continued and extreme denial of medical care including many deaths.  The order was influenced by the decades-long 
refusal and inability of the California prison system to alleviate or mitigate the harm.  The majority framed the 
decision in terms of structural injunctive relief, but seemed to appreciate that the order was a prophylactic injunction 
that addressed “the continuing cause of the harm,” as the operative statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
allowed injunctive relief to reach “the primary cause” of the constitution violation.  563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1910   
(2011). 
72 Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Spindelfabrik 
Suessen-Schurr v. Suber & Salzer Maschinenefabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
73 Golden, supra note 3, at *67. 
74 See, e.g., Silverlit Toys Manufactory Ltd. V. JP Commerce, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-08959-CAS-JC 9C.D. Cal. Apr. 
29, 2010) (enjoining the “marketing, reproducing, distributing, receiving, forwarding, shipping, displaying (on their 
websites or otherwise), or in any way commercially exploiting . . . any toy helicopters” that infringe the patent); 
Innovation U.S.A., Inc., v. Ido Furniture (U.S.A.) Corp., No. 1:09-cv-01727-JBW-RLM (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010). 
75 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 354. 
76 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753; Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997). 
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not present in the patent context.  Thus there is no need to subordinate this relief below other 
remedial options.  Moreover, as Golden notes, any undue burden to the defendant from the 
potential breadth of the injunction is mitigated by the specificity of the prophylactic injunction, 
which removes uncertainty and gives defendants freedom to continue their business practices and 
desired innovation and redesigns.
77
      
Golden conditions his argument a bit by suggesting steps courts could take to ensure that 
prophylaxis is not used “too readily or rashly” and result in overdeterrence.78  These steps 
however are unnecessary, as the law already contains parameters to circumscribe prophylactic 
injunctions to prevent overreaching.
79
  Prophylactic relief is not courts gone wild.  Properly 
issued prophylactic injunctions require causal connection between the activity restrained and 
violation of the law.
80
  This is a meaningful restriction, for when courts try to go astray from this 
and restrain legal conduct with no nexus to wrongdoing under the guise of prophylaxis, they are, 
and should be, struck down.
81
  There are thus legal rules in place, as there are with all 
injunctions, to avoid injunctions that extend too far.   
Prophylactic injunctions are practical and effective.  They make sense to the people in the 
trenches tasked with the job of implementing the abstraction of legal protections in the real world 
business context.  Simply put, “[p]rophylaxis seems to work.”82  Professor Golden’s research 
demonstrates this reality, showing the use of prophylactic relief in patent infringement cases 
through careful, exhaustive research.  The data shows that lawyers and judges understand the 
utility of a specially tailored injunction.  Golden uses this evidence to make the normative 
argument for prophylactic relief. “The key point,” he argues, “is that the remedial quiver of 
district courts appears to contain an additional arrow that the Federal Circuit and commentators 
have often neglected to discuss—the capacity to craft a specially tailored injunction.”83  His 
work erodes “the existing academic and political bias against such commonly-used judicial 
remedies” and shows that prophylactic relief has much to offer.84 
 
                                                 
77 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 382-83 (“[T]he certainty of prophylactic measures protects 
defendants against exposure to contempt punishment for violating a vague or confusing order.”). 
78 He suggests sunset provisions limiting the operative time of the injunction, judicial willingness to modify the 
injunction for changed circumstances, or requirements of special degrees of explicit justification by the party 
requesting the relief.  Golden, supra note 3, at *69. 
79 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 370-83; Schoenbrod, supra note 20, at 671-82 (explaining 
that prophylactic relief can give more than the plaintiff’s rightful position when necessary to remedy the violation as 
long as it aims for that rightful position and not some other purpose). 
80 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1 , at 309, 339-44. 
81 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (invalidating prophylactic relief of establishing civilian complaint 
system where no evidence that police department or its policies were the cause of continued police brutality and 
assaults); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-60 (1996) (invaliding prophylactic measures of prison law library 
hours, books, and Spanish speaking services that had no connection with harm of denial of access to courts to 
illiterate inmate); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 1997) (invalidating 
prophylactic measure of racial quotas for teachers finding no connection between faculty composition and proven 
discriminatory harm against students). 
82 Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra note 1, at 111. 
83 Golden, supra note 3, at *73. 
84 Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 1, at 306. 
